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Adjudication
Cubitt Building & Interiors Ltd v Richardson Roofing (Industrial) Ltd [2008] EWHC 1020 (TCC)

© Daniel Atkinson 21 October 2008


KEYWORDS: Cubitt Building and Interiors Limited v Richardson Roofing (Industrial) Limited [2008] EWHC 1020 (TCC), British Steel Corporation v. Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co. [1981] 24BLR94, DGT Steel & Cladding Ltd v. Cubitt Building & Interiors Ltd [2007] EWHC 1584 (TCC), Poseidon Freight Forwarding Ltd v Davies Turner Southern Ltd [1996] 2LLR388, Robertson v French (1803) 4 East,, British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co. [1981] 24BLR94, DGT Steel & Cladding Ltd v Cubitt Building & Interiors Ltd [2007] EWHC1584 (TCC), Poseidon Freight Forwarding Ltd v Davies Turner Southern Ltd [1996] 2LLR388, Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, DOM/1, Article 3.1, Clause 38A, adjudication, letter of intent, battle of forms, offer, acceptance, incorporation, terms, stay, Mr Justice Akenhead.

In Cubitt Building & Interiors Ltd v Richardson Roofing (Industrial) Ltd [2008] EWHC 1020 (TCC) Mr Justice Akenhead considered the not unfamiliar "battle of the forms" to establish whether there was a binding agreement to adjudicate or only a right to do so. The main adjudication issue was whether the tribunal of final jurisdiction should stay the proceedings to enable adjudication to take place.

Incorporation of Terms

Akenhead J held that the fact that a letter was described as a "Letter of Intent" does not particularly add anything to its legal status. he relied on British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co. [1981] 24BLR94 for the proposition that letters of intent can evidence or create a contract where none exist or simply be an indication that a party intends in the future to enter into a contract with the other party. It was necessary to analyse in terms of offer and acceptance what if anything was agreed by or what agreement was evidenced by the letter of intent in question.

It was held that the standard terms and conditions referred to on Cubitt's order were not attached, as the Order suggests that they were, and therefore Cubitt standard terms were not incorporated. The fact that, in the letter of intent, Cubitt indicated that it was the intention to enter into a "formal" subcontract in the future did not undermine the legal effect and purpose of the first paragraph in the letter which effectively was an acceptance of the most recently revised quotation. The fact that the letter indicated that when a formal subcontract was entered into the letter of intent provisions in effect lapsed was likely to be a statement of the obvious. The second paragraph itself indicated that until a formal contract was entered into the letter itself would have "effect" which was considered must be legal effect.

It was held relying on Chitty on Contracts terms may be incorporated by reference provided that reasonable notice is given particularly in relation to onerous terms. There was at least one onerous term, in Cubitt's terms, which was not in the standard DOM/1 contracts, namely a conditions precedent clause.

It was observed that in Poseidon Freight Forwarding Ltd. v Davies Turner Southern Ltd. [1996] 2LLR388, there was a reference on the faxed order to conditions set out on the back of the document but which were not in fact faxed. That was insufficient to allow for incorporation since that was not a case of terms available for inspection. The fact the terms were not sent was considered cogent evidence of an intention not to incorporate. Adopting that approach, Akenhead held that the fact that the proforma part of the order stated that the Cubitt standard terms were "attached" and they were not attached, pointed conclusively, simply as a matter of construction, to the proposition that the parties objectively did not intend that those standard terms should be incorporated.

It followed that the subcontract between the parties incorporated the DOM/1 conditions including the provisions for an arbitration set out in the DOM/1 form of sub-contract. It also followed that that the sub-contract did not incorporat Cubitt's standard terms and the pre condition in those standard terms that any court litigation must be preceded by adjudication.

Stay

Cubitt argued that if the Subcontract contained an arbitration clause, as indeed was decided, that it was  first entitled to an adjudication of the dispute pursuant to Section 108 of the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 and the Court had an inherent discretion to stay arbitral proceedings whilst such an adjudication took place.

It was held that as a matter of construction both of the DOM/1 contract conditions and the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 there was no pre-condition or indeed obligation requiring either party to refer any disputes to adjudication. There is simply a right on a party to proceed to adjudication at any time if it so wishes. That is to be contrasted with a binding agreement to adjudicate.

Reference was made to DGT Steel & Cladding Ltd v Cubitt Building & Interiors Ltd [2007] EWHC 1584 (TCC), but Akenhead J considered that was primarily concerned with what the court was to do or might do faced with a binding agreement to adjudicate. In the instant case there was no binding agreement to adjudicate. There was an agreement between the parties whereby either party could, at its own option, refer a matter to adjudication but there was no obligation on the party in question to refer the matter to adjudication.

Nonetheless it was observed that it may be appropriate in certain circumstances to build into the timetable in court or arbitration proceedings a 28-day period to enable one party to adjudicate if, for any good reason, it cannot sensibly pursue adjudication at the same time as its court or arbitration proceedings, but that is different from a stay. A party should not be forced to have Court or arbitration proceedings delayed or stayed by being forced to adjudicate when it does not want to exercise its right to do so. In this case it was held that the question of whether or not there should be a stay was not a matter which the Court could consider but entirely a matter for the arbitrator.

Judgment

The injunction to restrain continuation of an arbitration so that adjudication should proceed before any further proceedings, was refused.